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A.I.D. - AN HEIR OF CONTROVERSY
Charles E. Rice*
Introduction
All children were to be begotten by artificial insemination ("artsem",
it was called in Newspeak) and brought up in public institutions.
George Orwell, 19841
What is this thing called artificial insemination? Is it a menace to society?
Or is it a fantasy of little moment beyond the precincts of 1984 and the
"Brave New World"? Or does the fact lie somewhere in between? Whatever
your view, you can readily bolster your position by citing respectable authority.
For example, a respected advocate declaims that, "Nothing in modem times
has so seriously challenged the basic concept of our society founded as it is on
the biological tripod of father, mother and child which we call the family
unit."2 Oppositely, a competent man of medicine notes that, because of
medical advancements against the scourge of sterility, "artificial insemination
in the United States is not a widespread or growing practice; on the contrary,
it is being used less and less as time goes on."3
On the practicality and morality of the matter, an equally discordant
clash of opinions will be found, ranging from the lyrical praise of utopian
eugenists ("Who knows but that in this way we might even be able to prevent
another Hitler or some similar aberration of the genes. Is this not one of the
easiest and most direct ways of improving offspring and promoting a life of
less personal heartbreak and of greater happiness for the entire human
race?") ,4 to the scathing denunciation by an "eminent Jewish scholar" ("Such
human stud-farming exposes society to the gravest dangers which can never
be outweighted by the benefits that may accrue in individual cases.").5 On
the factual question of the extent of the practice, and its posture of ebb or
flow, the fair appraisal probably lies between the extremes, that is, between
regarding it as a genetic wave of the future or, on the other hand, as a receding
eddy of novelty, wholly outmoded by the progress of science. However, the
religious and social problems attendant upon artificial insemination are not
so readily dismissed. Their resolution is a matter properly beyond the com-
petence of this article. But, because no analysis of the legal implications of
* LL.B. Boston College, LL.M. New York University, Member of New York Bar, Associated
with KLM Royal Dutch Airlines.
1 ORWELL, 1984 at 52 (Signet edition, 1952).
2 Caddy, Artificial Human Insemination, 12 N. Y. CouNTY LAW. AssN. BAR BULL. 191, 195
(1955).
3 Weisman, Artificial Insemination: The Medical Viewpoint, 7 SYRAcusE L. REv. 96, 97 (1956).
4 Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L. Rav. 484, 485 (1948).
5 JAKoBovrrs, PROBLEMS OF JEWISH FAMILY LIFE 14 quoted in Kelly, Artificial Insemination:
Theological and Natural Law Aspects, 33 U. Daf. L. J. 135 (1955).
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artificial insemination would be complete without some canvass of the deeper
issues inextricably involved, this survey of the cases and comments will con-
clude with a selection of religious, ethical and social pronouncements on the
subject.
I. HISTORY
The history of artificial insemination shows it to be a fitful starter and
a late comer. Artificial insemination is of two types, one (homologous
artificial insemination) where the seminal fluid of a husband is injected by
mechanical means into his wife so as to induce conception, and the other
(heterologous artificial insemination) where the seed is that of a "donor",
other than the husband. For convenience, we will refer to the former as AIH,
to the latter as AID, and to artificial insemination in general as AL. The first
recorded AI was performed on a dog in the eighteenth century by the Italian
physiologist, Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729-1799)." AIH was first practiced
on a human by the English physician, Dr. John Hunter, in 1799.7 The first
recorded successful AIH in the United States was accomplished in 1866 by
Dr. J. Marion Sims, of South Carolina, who later abandoned the technique
as immoral. 8 In the United States, AID appears to have been practiced first
in the 1890s,9 but others place its beginning in this country in the first decade
of the twentieth century. 10 From the 1890s, the practice of AI gained an in-
creasing acceptance in Europe, and records reveal its use from that time in
France, Germany, Switzerland and Spain." Certain it is, though, that the
sharp upward curve of its growth did not begin anywhere until the present
century.'
2
Artificial Inseminati6n has been described as "indigenous to western
culture."' 3 It has been said, on the contrary, that Al is probably no more
common in the United States than in other countries, although its incidence
in this country and in Great Britain is probably greater, owing to religious
influences, than in Latin America and other Catholic countries. 14 It must be
remembered that generalities and statistics are here of even less than usual
efficacy, owing to the normal atmosphere of secrecy enshrouding an artificial
insemination, and to the deliberate falsification of records encouraged by it.
However, the tentative statistical conclusions advanced by competent re-
searches into this social phenomenon can be of definite, though tentative,
6 Holloway, Artificial Insemination: An examination of the Legal Aspects, 43 A. B. A. J.
1089 (1957).
7 GLOVER, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AMONG HUMAN BEINGS 4-5 (1948); cf. SIEGLER, FERTILITY
IN WOMEN (1944).
8 Greenhill, Artificial Insemination: Its Medicolegal Implications, SYmposium ON MEDICOLEGAL
PROBLEMS 45 (1948); cf. HARSs AND BROWIN, WOM'S SURGEON: THE LIFE STORY OF J. MARION
SisS (1950); GLOVER, op. cit. supra note 7.
9 Folsome, The Status of Artificial Insemination: A Critical Review, 45 Am. J. OBST. AND
GYNECOL. 915 (1943).
10 See GLOVER, op. cit. supra note 7.
11 Cf. VAN DE VELDE, FERTILITY AND STERILITY IN MARRIAGE (Browne's translation, 1951).
12 Cf. Folsome, op. cit. supra note 9.
13 Mangin, Artificial Insemination: The Sociological and Anthropological Viewpoint, 7 SYIRACUSE
L. REV. 106 (1956).
14 Weisman, op. cit. supra note 3.
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assistance to our evaluation. Estimates tell us that there are about two million
childless couples in the United States, that 10 to 16 per cent of all marriages
in this country are sterile, and that the husband is the sterile factor in 35-40%
of these.15 For many of these who actually want children, adoption is not a
wholly satisfactory form of relief, principally because of the long delays, 16
and also because of the lack of fulfillment of the maternal urge and the
absence of the inheritable characteristics of either spouse in the adopted
child." Artificial insemination, both AIH and AID has been used in such
cases with a substantial degree of mechanical success and no unusual danger
of infection or miscarriage.' 8
It has been estimated that 1,000 to 1,200 babies are conceived by
artificial insemination each year in the United States, compared with ap-
proximately 4,000,000 children normally conceived.' 9 There are probably
50,000 to 100,000 artificially inseminated individuals alive in the United
States today.20 Further, it is a captivating footnote to our modem age that,
to the onetime personal and mystical preserve of the generative process the
wonders of science lately have added the blessings of mass-production and
the deep-freeze, with the establishment of institutions quaintly described as
sperm banks.2 ' In short, although it is difficult to gauge with accuracy the
extent of artificial insemination, the conclusion may safely be drawn that "it
has certainly increased enormously in the last twenty years" both in this
country and in England.22 This practical certainty compels a searching
scrutiny of the position and future of this practice. It may be that "modem
research in the physiology of human reproduction indicates that resort to it
[artificial insemination] will become less and less necessary."2 3 However, the
legal consequences of AI, particularly those touching upon interitance rights,
are necessarily long delayed and, even were the practice wholly stopped im-
mediately, there would remain a challenging legal problem of great potential
complexity.
2 4
15 Warner, Artificial Insemination in Cases of Incurable Sterility, PAPERS DELIVERED BEFORE THE
SOCIETY OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 200, 201 (1954); cf. Davis, The Problem of Sterility Today, 1
AMERICAN PRACTITONER 1 (1946); Cone, Survey of Present Status and Problems of Sterility, 37
TEx. J. MED. 20 (1941); Stone, Fertility Services in Planned Parenthood Programs, 10 HUMAN
FERTILrry 9 (1945); FISHBEIN AND BURGESS, SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE 80 (1955); PLOSCOWE, SEX AND
THE LAW 113 (1951); 5 CURRENT MED. 33 (1958); Note, 3 WAYNE L. REv. 35 (1956).
16 See New York Times, April 5, 1952, p. 18, col. 1.
17 See Note, 34 IowA L. REv. 658 (1949).
18 For example, 80 per cent success in AID attempts is reported in Haman, Results in Artificial
Insemination, 10 OBSTET. AND GYNEC. SURVEY 306 (1955); and 74 conceptions, with 52 normal full-
term deliveries, out of 116 artificial inseminations were achieved in a series of inseminations noted
in 5 CURRENT MED. 33 (1958). See also, O'Rahilly, Artificial Insemination-Medical Aspects, 34
U. DET. L. J. 383 (1957), stating that most writers estimate a 60 - 80 per cent ratio of success in
inducing pregnancy, with infections rare and with no unusual incidence of abortions.
19 Lang, Artificial Insemination-Legitimate or Illegitimate, McCalls, May, 1955, p. 60.
20 Prof. Ploscowe of New York University School of Law has estimated the number in 1955
at 50,000 in the United States, with at least 10,000 of them in New York City. New York Post,
Mar. 28, 1955, p. 4, p. 18; Seymour and Koerner, Artificial Insemination, 116 J. AM. MED. AssN.
2747 (1941); Note, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 304 (1955); Israel, The Scope of Artificial Insemination in
the Barren Marriage, 202 AM. J. MED. Sm. 92 (1941).
21 See, NEw YORK Crrv SANrrARY CODE § 112, impliedly regulating such banks.
22 Puxon, Without Father Bred, 102 SOLICrroRs' L. J. 95 (1958).
23 Folsome, op. cit. supra note 9.
24 See Note, 8 IND. L. J. 620 (1953).
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U1. LEGAL ASPECTS
In our discussion of the legal problems attendant upon AI, our inquiry
will be limited practically to AID. AIH is free from virtually all legal diffi-
culties, except, for example, the question of whether AIH is such a con-
summation of a marriage as to bar an action for annulment by the wife on
the grounds of the husband's impotency. (This problem impinges on the sub-
ject of the legitimacy of AI offspring, and will be discussed below in that
connection.) AID, on the other hand, is a wellspring of real and imaginary
legal problems. Primary, of course, are the questions of adultery and legitim-
acy; of secondary importance are such matters as the liability of the insemin-
ating doctor and the donor, the customary falsification of birth records, and
possible subsequent inter-marriage of related offspring of the same donor.
A) Adultery
The problem of adultery has been the most productive of litigation con-
verning AID. The first case in the world to take a definite stand on this point
was Orford v. Orford,2 5 where Justice Orde of the Ontario Supreme Court
labelled AID as "a monstrous act of adultery," since it involved:
... the voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive
powers or faculties of the guilty person; and any submission of these
powers to the service or enjoyment of any person other than the husband
or wife comes within the definition of adultery.
2 6
In the court's view, the essence of adultery lies not in any "moral
turpitude" or in the actual physical congress, but rather in the fact that:
... in the case of the woman, it involves the possibility of introducing
into the family of the husband a false strain of blood. Any act on the
part of the wife which does that, would, therefore, be adulterous. 27
It should be noted, however, that this resounding pronoucement was
not necessary to the decision of the case. The suit was one brought by the
wife for support. The husband's defense in effect asserted that his wife had
committed adultery by submitting to AID without his consent and that she
therefore was not entitled to support. The court found as a fact that a child
had been born to the wife, not through AID, but through quite ordinary
adultery. The court could have rested with that finding, but chose to elaborate
its view of the law on the novel subject of AID and to assert that, even had
there been AID and not common adultery, the wife would have been equally
an adulteress.
In the intervening years, the theory of the Orford case has not gained a
commanding position. A dictum by Lord Dunedin, in the English case of
Russell v. Russell"' that the essence of adultery is not intercourse but rather
"fecundation ab extra", was seized upon by adherents of the Orford decision
as a confirmation of their view. However, the question of AID was in no way
involved in the Russell case; rather the court was discussing a problem arising
from actual physical insemination.
25 49 Ont. I. R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
26 Id. at 258.
27 Ibid.
28 A.C. 687, 721 (1924).
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The next significant case, and the first American one, was Hoch v.
Hoch,29 where, on facts similar to those in the Orford case, Judge Feinberg
came to a contrary conclusion. The court granted the husband a divorce be-
cause the wife had committed adultery in the usual way; but, the court
ventured the opinion that, if the wife had proven her contention that she had
submitted to AID, and had not committed ordinary adultery, she could not
be divorced, that is, that AID would not be such evidence of adultery as to
constitute grounds for divorce.
In 1948, Justice Greenberg of the Supreme Court in New York County,
delivered the celebrated dictum that a child born by AID is as legitimate as
"a child born out of wedlock who by law is made legitimate upon the marriage
of the interested parties."3 The legitimacy aspects of the case will be treated
below. It should be observed here only that the court's equation of an AID
child with one "born out of wedlock" implicitly acknowledges that an AID
impregnation is extra-marital in nature. If the court's analogy is correct, it is
difficult to see why the wife's submission to AID is not adultery, in some non-
technical sense of the term.
In 1954, Judge Gorman of the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois,
rendered a ringing declaratory judgment in the case of Doornbos v. Doorn-
bos.31 The court declared that, while AIR- is wholly unobjectionable in law,
AID is contrary to public policy, is adultery on the part of the wife, and a
child so conceived is illegitimate; as an illegitimate, the child is the mother's
alone, and the husband can have no interest in the child. An appeal was
dismissed by the appellate court without discussion of the question of AI.32
The Doornbos case is the nearest thing we have to an American decision
squarely on the adultery and legitimacy aspects of AID.
Later, and on the European scene, in 1956, the Civil Court of Rome is
reported to have held AID to be adultery.33 Even more recently, The Court
of Session in Scotland has held squarely to the contrary, that is, that AID is
not adultery and that therefore no divorce can be granted solely upon that
basis.34
In all this confusing welter of decisions, none is a judgment of an
authoritative court of final jurisdiction. Without such a definitive determin-
ation, the task of forecasting the law becomes less a matter of projection of
precedents and more one of analysis of root concepts and policies. Such an
analysis will demonstrate that AID, whatever its attendant evils, and what-
ever the desirability of its restriction, cannot properly be brought within the
accepted definitions of adultery.
The position of the Orford court, that any surrender of the reproductive
faculties is adultery, is at variance with the usual common law and statutory
29 Unreported, Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1948); see Chicago Sun, Feb. 10, 1945, p. 13, col
3; Time, Feb. 26, 1945, p. 58.
30 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct., 1948).
31 No. 54 S. 14981, Super. Qt. Cook County, Dec. 13, 1954, 23 U.S. L. WEEK 2308 (1954).
32 12 111. App. 2d 473 (1955).
33 Hahlo, Some Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 74 So. Ap. L. 3. 167 (1957),
citing Rand (So. Africa) Daily Mail, July 16, 1956.
34 Maclennan v. Maclennan, 1958 S.L.T. 12 (1958).
A.I.D.
definitions of adultery, which require physical connection."5 This element of
personal physical connection seems to be necessary, whether the issue arises
in a prosecution for adultery,36 or in a civil matrimonial action.
37
It is a reflection of the fact that AID generates many of the evils of
adultery, particularly as an introduction into the family unit of the child of
another man, that many commentators, and leaders outside of the legal pro-
fession, have proposed that it should be treated as adultery. For example, the
Commission appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in its report, Artifi-
cial Human Insemination 8s states: "It seems to us that adultery involves the
surrender of the reproductive powers or the organs of generation, whether
capable of actual generation or not."39 Where the Orford decision, in its
emphasis upon surrender of the reproductive faculties, would arguably re-
quire an ability to procreate before such adultery could be committed, the
Commission would slam and bolt the door upon that equivocation and would
treat AID as adultery, even if the wife were barren. Similarly, a Catholic
priest has proposed a definition of adultery as "any voluntary surrendering to
another person of the reproductive powers or faculties of the guilty party for
those acts which are apt in themselves for the generation of children. '40 Such
attempts to extend the definition of adultery are sober reactions, based upon
a well-grounded fear. AID introduces a spurious heir; it is, if disclosed, pro-
ductive of social stigma; it can unsettle the normal stability of the family
unit; and it can lead to a transference of the wife's affections to the anonymous
donor.41 None of these consequences will evaporate simply because the in-
trusion by the donor is with the husband's consent. These injurious results of
the practice are good reasons for its restriction or prohibition. However, they
do not warrant, and do not require for their prevention, a novel reconstruction
of the settled concept of adultery.
Rather, it should be conceded that AI is a wholly new character in the
drama of the law. It should be treated as such. Any attempt to fit AID into
the pre-cast mold of adultery is bound to involve us in contradictions and
absurdities. For example, if the donor has died before the wife is impregnated
with his seed (such can happen where a "sperm bank" is used), the wife
would be in the anomalous situation of committing adultery with a dead
man, a ludicrous notion; or the impregnation of the wife with a mixture of
seed from her husband and from the donor, a common technique, could
arguably result in the commission by the wife of adultery with her husband,
particularly if the husband were not wholly sterile and if it therefore were
3r5 Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943); Warner v. State, 202
Ind. 479, 175 N.E. 661 (1930); in England, see Dennis v. Dennis 1955 P. 153; in Canada, see Badineau
v. Badineau, 4 D.L.Rl 951 (1924); see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100, defining adultery as "sexual
intercourse of two persons."
36 See, e.g., Warner v. State, supra note 35.
37 Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N.J. Eq. 507, 80 AUt. 119 (1911).
38 Bartholomew, Legal Implications of Artificial Insemination, 21 MoDEPN L. Ray. 236 (1958).
39 For a discussion of the various views on this point in the Netherlands, see Hablo, op. cit. supra
note 33.
40 Petz, Artificial Insemination-Legal Aspects, 34 U. DaT. L. J. 404, 413 (1957).
41 See notes, 8 U. FLA. L. R. 304 (1955); and 9 S.C.L.Q. 232 (1956).
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possible that his seed could accomplish the actual impregnation. 42 A far
better approach would be to by-pass the concept of adultery and to treat AID
as what it is, a new genus. Where its treatment as adultery would require the
automatic imposition of the sanctions and evidentiary rules associated with
adultery, an independent approach to AID would permit a fresh examination
into the merits of the question, unfettered by a predetermination of the logi-
cally necessary results which would follow upon its definition as adultery.
Such a technique would permit a fresh appraisal of the desirability, also, of
attaching to AID, where the appropriate circumstances are present, the con-
sequences now attendant upon such actions as fornication, seduction, rape,
incest. The merits of various approaches to the problems raised by Al will be
discussed below. For the present, suffice it to say that AID should not be
included within the definition of adultery. The precision of language ought
not to be so freely abused.
B) Legitimacy
The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the offspring of AID is a question
productive of much less difficulty than the problem of adultery. The matter of
legitimacy in this context does not involve the potential casuistry of exact
definition to the extent that that danger is found in the adultery question.
Rather, the problem seems to be resolved largely as a deduction from general
principles. Where a court approves of the practice of AID, legitimacy follows
with little or no indulgence in finely-spun rationalizations. (Where the Strnad
43
court attempted the construction of a rationale, the attempt was hardly suc-
cessful.) Conversely, if a judge is opposed to AID as a social institution, his
denial of legitimacy follows practically as a matter of course with little actual
reliance upon definition.
The judicial tone regarding AI apparently was set in 1883, when the
first court ever to consider the general subject of Al (AIH in that case)
condemned it as a practice "contrary to the natural law and which could
constitute a veritable social danger." The court, the Tribunal of Bordeaux,
-in France, rejected in this case the suit of a doctor for a fee for the per-
formance of AIH.44 Subsequently, however, a Commission appointed by the
Societe de Medicine Legale de France to review the matter, disagreed with
the court's view of AIH as contrary to the natural law and a menace to
society.
45
In the next judicial pronouncement upon the subject, the German
Supreme Court in 1908, employed the same method of reasoning to find AIH
not adulterous cohabitation within the meaning of the German Civil Code,
and declared an AIH child to be legitimate.
46
42 For a good discussion of these and other absurdities resulting from the treatment of AID
as adultery, see Hahlo, op. cit. supra note 33.
43 Strnad v. Stmad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct., 1948).
44 Glover, op. cit. supra note 7, at 44; see Koerner, op. cit. supra note 4.
45 Glover, op. cit. supra note 7, at 44; see LoGatto, Artificial Insemination, Legal Aspects, 1
CATHOLIC LAW. 172 (1955).
46 Bartholomew, op. cit. supra note 38, at 238.
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These two cases were concerned with AIH and the rule announced by
the German Supreme Court is generally accepted today, and properly so.
When controversy concerns AID, more variables enter, but the approach is
essentially the same process of an almost automatic deduction from an in-
stinctive reaction.
In the much-quoted decision of Strnad v. Strnad,47 the court was deciding
a motion to fix the extent of the separated husband's right to visit the child
who was in the mother's custody. The court held the defendant husband to be
a fit visitor for the child, and stated that he was not deprived of the parental
right by the fact that the child was the offspring of a AID consented to by the
husband. The court held "that the child has been potentially adopted or semi-
adopted by the defendant,"48 and that the husband "is entitled to the same
rights as those acquired by a foster parent who has formally adopted a child,
if not the same rights as those to which a natural parent under the circum-
stances would be entitled."49 Although this is not, as some commentators have
suggested, an equation by definition of AID with adoption, it is an attribution
of the same results to each. As such, it would appear to run counter to the
spirit of the formal adoption statute"° which would not permit an implied
adoption. In a gratuitous pronouncement upon the question of legitimacy, the
court went further afield and stated that "the situation is no different than that
pertaining in the case of a child born out of wedlock who by law is made
legitimate upon the marriage of the interested parties."5' To the contrary is
the settled rule that the inter-marriage which will legitimize a child born out
of wedlock is the inter-marriage of the mother and the natural father (here the
donor) ;Sla the mother's marriage to her husband would appear to be irrelevant
to the automatic legitimation sought by the court. In reality, the court seemed
to be essaying a new variation of the general rule, by referring to the marriage,
not of a mother and a natural father, but of the "interested parties." This
attempted new departure probably sprang from the court's instinctive distrust
of, and distaste for, the weird legal and social problems generated by the new
problem child of the law, as well as from a natural and laudable concern for
the welfare of the innocent AID child.
The Strnad decision was eventually frustrated in effect. After the decision,
the wife took the AID child to Oklahoma and refused the husband his visita-
tion rights. An Oklahoma court upheld her position and apparently ruled
that the child was illegitimate, was the child only of its mother, and that the
husband had no visitation rights.5 2 Justice Greenberg, in vindication of his
earlier decree, thereupon held Mrs. Strnad to be guilty of contempt.53
47 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct., 1948).
48 Id. at 391.
49 Ibid.
50 NEw YORK DoMEstic RELATIONS LAW (Art. 7), § 110.
51 Id. § 24.
51a Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.$. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct., 1948).
52 Unreported; see 1950 Wis. L. R. 136 (1949), citing Milwaukee Journal, Aug. 6, 1949, p. 2,
col. 3; Cf. Caddy, op. cit. supra note 2.
53 Strnad v. Stmad, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (Sup Ct., 1948).
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An equally decisive, but quite opposite, view was taken by the Superior
Court of Cook County in the Doornbos case 3a where Judge Gorman con-
demned AID, with or without the consent of the husband, as "contrary to
public policy and good morals", and branded the offspring of AID as
illegitimate. When we add to these, the 1956 judgment of the Civil Court of
Rome,54 holding AID to be adultery and the offspring to be illegitimate, we
have virtually completed our canvass of the cases bearing immediately upon
the question of legitimacy.
Collaterally, an English case in 19 4 9 55 held that conception and birth of
a child by AIH does not necessarily amount to such an approbation of the
marriage by the wife as to stop her from seeking an annulment of the marriage
on the ground of the husband's impotency.5 6 In this case the annulment was
granted to the wife, even though the result was that the child in question was
made illegitimate. Society's abhorrence of the harsher effects of Al was swiftly
demonstrated here by the reaction of Parliament. A statute enacted a few
months later provided that any child who would have been legitimate if his
parents' marriage were dissolved by divorce shall be legitimate even though
the marriage is voidable and annulled.
57
C) Related Problems
No reported cases have been concerned with the theoretically perplexing
problems collateral to the main issues of adultery and illegitimacy. For ex-
ample, what can be done to, or for, the doctor who conducts the insemin-
ation? Would he be liable for malpractice if he were negligent? It is hard to
see why he should not be. The Bureau of Legal Medicine and Legislation of
the American Medical Association has reported that a doctor who performs an
AID does run some risk of an action for malpractice. 58 Would he be liable for
breach of warranty if the sperm were of inferior quality? Not only would this
be difficult to prove, but one can envision disputes about the genetic "quality"
of sperm which would do credit to a debate at a livestock breeders' conven-
tion. Would the doctor be subject to criminal prosecution for adultery? In
theory, perhaps, but it is difficult enough to get District Attorneys to prosecute
conventional adulterers, without using such a legal sledgehammer to liquidate
the sociological gad-fly which is AID. 59 Where the AID is performed without
the husband's consent, the doctor conceivably could be liable on the theory of
interference with family relations and the wife could possibly be guilty of a
fraud upon her husband. The procurement by the doctor of releases from the
parties would not protect him against criminal prosecution and would prob-
53a 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Dec. 13, 1954).
54 Hablo, op. cit. supra note 33.
55 R.E.L. v. E.L. 1949 P. 22; 1 All E.R. 141 (1949).
56 See G. v. M., 10 A. C. 171 (1885) or the English theory of approbation as a bar to annul-
ment; Slater v. Slater, 1 All E.R. 246 (1953); D. v. A., 1 Rob. Eec. 279.
57 14 GEo. VI c. 25, S. 9 (1951); see opinion in Bartholomew, op. cit. supra note 38, at 236-237,
that nothing in the statutory or common law of England makes Al per se illegal and that therefore
AI itself is at the moment lawful in England.
58 147 J. Am. MED. AssN. 250 (1951); see Lo Gatto, op. cit. supra note 45.
59 This point is discussed in Ploscowe, The Place of Law in Medico-Moral Problems: A Legal
View II, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1238 (1956).
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ably not be of much assistance to him in defending a civil action.60 Finally,
although this list is by no means exhaustive of theoretical bases of liability,
the doctor could be guilty of fraud or forgery for knowingly registering the
husband on the birth certificate as the father of the AID child. This possibility
is of real significance, and such falsification presents a genuine threat to the
reliability of public records."' Some doctors have adopted the practice of
referring the case, after insemination, to another physician for actual delivery
of the baby; the second physician, unaware of the AID, registers the husband
as the father with no conscious falsification.62 This practice, however, does not
eliminate the fraud, but rather seeks to perpetrate it through the pen of an
innocent agent.
One result of this falsification of records, and of the general secrecy
enveloping AID, could be unwitting intermarriage between off-spring of the
same donor. This likelihood has been discounted and ignored by some
advocates of AID, but it is a problem of inevitably practical significance. Its
solution would seem to require a modification of the confidential nature of
the AID process; as a corollary, the imposition of professional and criminal
sanctions upon all knowing parties to the fraud could have some deterrent
effect. Lest it be thought that this is indulging in a flight of fancy, it should
be noted that multiple donations by a single donor are quite common. There
is record of at least one donor whose talents for vicarious generation were
successfully exerted upon 35 women. 3 The frequency of donations may be
accounted for, at least in part, by the indefatigable zeal of medical students,
who are a frequent source of supply, aid by the more prosaic fact that donors
are generally paid.64
The donor himself is not entirely free from potential legal embroilments.
It could be theoretically argued that he is guilty of adultery, especially if he
is married and his own wife did not consent to his donating, but the same
practical considerations militate against that in his case as in the case of the
doctor. It is questionable whether, even in our frantic modern day, the ad-
vantages of remote control should be so extended to invade the traditional
notion of adultery. Conceivably, the donor could be held to an obligation to
support his offspring. This would appear to be a desirable result in principle,
and would tend to reduce the broadcast procreation which can lead to incest
and a general disregard for personal responsibilities. However, if the donor
supports the child, would he not be entitled to custody of the child? Collateral
to this would be the question of the AID child's right to inherit from the
donor and the donor's right to inherit from him. Also, if the donor were to
make a knowingly or negligently false representation to the doctor about his
background and characteristics, he could be liable for the damage caused by
60 Goldfarb, Artificial Insemination-The Legal Viewpoint, 7 SYRAcusE L. REv. 108 (1955).
61 See Note, 32 WASH. L. REv. 280 (1957); Petz, op. cit. supra note 40.
62 Ibid.
63 Haman, Results in Artificial Insemination, 72 J. UROLOGY 557 (1954).
64 See O'Rahilly, op. cit. supra note 18, at 387, commenting that, in this way, "Humanitarian
masturbation, as one writer puts it, becomes ovinistic prostitution."
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his unrevealed defects.6 5 In a different vein, there is the possibility that an
unscrupulous donor who learned the identities of the recipients of his favor,
might resort to blackmail; conversely, a donor could be a likely target himself
for blackmail.
Statutes dealing with Al have been notable by their absence. The British
statute66 passed to counteract the R.E.L. v. E.L. decision, is one which deals
indirectly with the problem. Another is Section 112 of the Sanitary Code of
the City of New York,67 which prescribes certain medical tests for the donor
and would-be-mother, and requires the keeping of records. This last ordinance
conveys a tacit approval of AID, but the extent of the approval appears less
emphatic when we consider the unique provocation which led to its adoption.
Dr. Weisman6 relates that, in 1947, a number of physicians in New York City
received this notice from an enterprising individual with a Bachelor of
Science degree:
We offer semen drawn from healthy and investigated professional
donors. Suitable types for your patients' specifications. Active speci-
mens guaranteed and delivered daily. Confidential service - office
hours 5:30 to 7 P.M.
There followed the name and address of the proprietor. As a reaction to
this astonishing essay in human husbandry, the amendment to Section 112
was adopted.
Statutes directly dealing with AID have been proposed in at least six
states,6sa but none has been enacted. A fairly typical example of the sort of
legislation which has been introduced is the New York Statute proposed in
194969 which would declare that a child born of AID with the "express or
implied consent" of the husband is the "legitimate, natural child of both the
husband and his wife for all purposes." Such a statute would solve the
legitimacy problem, but not much else.Y' It is most probable that such statutes
as the N.Y. City Criminal Court Act, Sec. 61, which illegitimizes children
"begotten at a time when the husband is impotent" would apply to neither
variety of Al. The transparent intent of such a statute is directed against the
offspring of truly adulterous unions.
A unique Arizona statute 71 may have the apparently unintended effect
of making an AID child the legitimate child of the donor, with full rights of
inheritance:
A. Every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is en-
titled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock,
except that he is not entitled to the right to dwell or reside with
the family of his father, if the father is married.
65 For liability for negligent statements, see Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275
(1922).
66 14 GEo. VI c. 25, § 9 (1951).
67 NEW YORK Crry SANITARY CODE § 112.
68 Op. cit. supra, note 3, at 98.
68a Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
69 S. 811, 172nd. Sess. (N.Y. 1949).
70 See also the bill introduced in Virginia, S. 745, G.A. Sess. (1948).
71 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-206 (1921).
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B. Every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from their
kindred heirs, lineal and collateral, in the same manner as children
born in lawful wedlock.
C. This section shall apply although the natural father of such child is
married to a woman other than the mother of the child, as well
as when he is single.
No reported cases have construed this statute in relation to Al. An un-
equivocal imposition of responsibility upon the donor, especially the fin-
ancial responsibility of inheritance, may be the key to a swift, painless
abolition of AID.
There are other incidental legal problems and possible developments,
but this sampling should demonstrate that Al in general, and AID in par-
ticular, present a virtual no-man's-land replete with pitfalls. Any solution,
statutory or otherwise, which failed to take into account these subsidiary
questions would be seriously defective.
The reader may wonder why, if there are a substantial number of Als
performed each year, there have been so few cases bearing directly on the
subject. One reason, of course, is the normal secrecy of the operation. Another
is the influence of the rules of evidence. One of the most pertinent of these
is the presumption of legitimacy, one of the strongest in the law.72 Presum-
ably, this would apply to an AID child. The Superior Court of Cook County,
Illinois, in Ohisen v. Ohlsen 3 so employed it in holding that conflicting
evidence on the issue of whether a child had been born by AID was not
sufficient to overcome the presumption. Therefore, the court was constrained
to consider the child legitimate and was barred from an exploration of the
merits of AID.
There are other inhibiting rules, such as that which forbids testimony by
a husband or wife against the other on the issue of adultery in a marital
action founded upon an allegation of adultery.74 Also relevant are the recog-
nized disability of a spouse to testify, without the consent of the other, to
confidential communications made during marriage,71 and the general in-
competency of a spouse to testify to non-access during wedlock where the
effect would be to show the illegitimacy of the offspring.76 Through the
operation of these adjectival rules, the incidence of litigation in this area is
greatly reduced. Indeed, their effect may be so restrictive as to make the con-
trivance of arguments and solutions a mere academic exercise. However,
evidentiary rules governing the marital relation are not uniformly recognized
and applied and there are exceptions to them. For example, the pedigree
exception to the hearsay rule 7 would seem to permit an AID child to testify
to what his deceased relatives told him about his origin. Also, the physician -
patient privilege may generally be waived by the patient or his estate, and
72 Matter of Matthews' Estate, 153 N.Y. 443, 447, 47 N.E. 401 (1897); Commissioner of Pub.
Welfare v. Roehler, 284 N.Y. 260, 30 N.E. 2d 487 (1940).
73 Unreported, Nov., 1954; see 187 J. AMER. MaD. ASSN. 1639 (1955); discussed in Note, 8
U. FLA. L. REv. 304 (1955); 32 WASH. L. Rav. 280 (1957).
74 See, e.g., N.Y. CII. PRACTICE AcT, § 349.
75 Ibid.; N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 2445.
76 Chamberlain v. People, 23 N.Y. 85.
77 Eisenlord v. Clum, 126 N.Y. 552, 27 N.E. 1024 (1891).
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would therefore not seriously inhibit a patient who desires to testify as to the
confidential medical aspects of AI.78 In short, the fact that the rules of evi-
dence will reduce the amount of litigation concerning Al should not be an
excuse to abandon an effort to arrive at a just and equitable solution for the
problem. There have been litigated cases, and we can confidently expect more.
This alone is enough to justify our inquiry.
III. SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS
Its sociological elements are inseparable from the other parts of the Al
problem. It requires little exposition to emphasize the tremendous effect, for
good or ill, that AID can have upon the heretofore impregnable family unit.
AIH, of course, gives rise to practically no difficulty in this area.
The extent of the gulf between the opposite schools of social thought on
AID can be readily seen from the statements of proponents of the varying
points of view.
For example, the stand of those who approve of AD in a sociological
context, is epitomized in the following illustrations.
An emphatic commendation is offered by one doctor in these words:
Only occasionally do problems arise in the home where a baby has
been born of artificial insemination; the results are, in the main, ex-
cellent. The wife has given birth to her child, thus satisfying her mater-
nal instinct; the husband has "fathered" a child and in the eyes of the
world his virility has been established; the child experiences even more
love than the ordinary child, since he had been sought eagerly and with
much effort. In fact, all three members of the family comprise a happy
home. The proof of such a state of contentment is evidenced by the fact
that a large percentage of the couples return for a second baby to be
conceived by this method7 9
This opinion touches upon one of the central issues in AID, namely the
effect for good or evil on the home into which the child is introduced. Another
sociological writer amplifies this view by an averment that illustrations from
other societies "indicate that it is possible for a society's family organization
to operate in a stable fashion with the reproductive function partly outside." 0
It can fairly be said that those who approve of AID emphasize, in
speaking of its effect upon society, the blessings of unity and fulfillment which
are brought to the barren family by the AID child. Naturally, opposite ex-
pressions are not lacking and are no less strongly held.
Unfortunately, there is here, in common with most heated controversies,
a touch of radical extravagance on the part of some advocates and even
practitioners of AID. For example, Dr. Joseph Fletcher, in his book Morals
and Medicines ' mentions a physician in England who had been artificially in-
seminating unmarried women and who justified it on the ground that "it is
every woman's heritage to bear a child... artificial insemination provides the
78 See N.Y. CrvIL PRAcTIcE AcT, § 352.
79 Weisman, op. cit. supra note 3, at 98.
80 Mangin, op. cit. supra note 13.
81 (1954), at 103-104.
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unmarried busmess woman with a decent and moral method of acquiring the
children nature intended her to bear.
8 2
A eugenic lament is heard from a medical source. A qualified physician
states:
Physicians to the human race are, in comparison with physicians
to dumb brutes, leagues behind in both scientific investigation and the
successful practice of artificial insemination. To be sure, we are tram-
meled by conventions, moral codes and frailties of human character,
which never hinder the stockbreeder58
If this conjures up discomforting visions of official breeding stations and
the like, the following suggestion from a prominent Australian lawyer will
give you an uneasy feeling that time does march on and that perhaps 1984
will soon be with us in more ways than one. Mr. Ivor L. M. Richardson, in
an article "Artificial Insemination" states:
Again, it is suggested (and Mr. Richardson seems to agree) that
a government or government-approved social welfare agency is better
fitted to decide whether or not artificial insemination is desirable in
the circumstances and to select donors for a particular couple than is
the family medical practitioner, though a medical practitioner should
perform the actual impregnation.8 4
These examples of opinions supporting AID in its sociological aspects
cannot pretend to be a thorough-going canvass. Rather, they appear to ex-
emplify most of the favoring arguments, some patently well-intentioned and
born of sober reflection, and others somewhat less temperate and hardly
well-considered.
If AID's opponents among social thinkers, are lacking in the flamboy-
ancy of some of their opposite brethren, they are deficient neither in ardor nor
even in vehemence. The pragmatic arguments of the advocates of AID, to
the effect that AID can cement an otherwise truncated family into an en-
during unit, are particular subjects of attack.
The objection is stated in general terms as follows:
Children do not assure success in marriage just as the lack of them
does not necessarily preclude it .... [I]t becomes evident that undis-
criminating attempts to give children to the childless can in many cases
produce results detrimental to the welfare of society.8
In a more particular vein, it has been stated by one medical authority:
It has been said by Farris and Garrison8 6 that one reason why
certain married couples seek artificial insemination is to conceal in-
fertility. This indicates immediately that they are already experiencing
difficulties in meeting and successfully coping with.the realities of life.
82 Your writer takes refuge in the immortal lines of Edgar Smith, as sung by Marie Dressier,
in "Tillie's Nightmare":
"You may tempt the.upper classes
With your villainous demi-tasses,
But Heaven will protect the Working Girl."
83 Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Human Sterility, 19
BULL. op TH N.Y. AcADEMY op MEDicInE 576 (1943).
84 30 AUsTRAuN L. J. 125, 128 (1956).
85 Lamson, Pinard and Meaker, Sociological and Psychological Aspects of Artificial Insemination
with Donor Semen, 145 J. Am. Mm. AssN. 1062, 1063 (1954).
86 Farris and Garrison, Emotional Impact of Successful Donor Insemination: A Report on 38
Couples, 3 OBs. AND GYNc, No. 1 (1954).
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If they can not face and accept certain physical inadequacies, how
can they expect to meet the additional problems presented by parent-
hood which presupposes that the individual is expected to have devel-
oped full emotional maturity? It suggests that they are avoiding reality
and this neuropathic trait is so frequently associated with the psycho-
neurotic, the pre-psychotic and even the psychotic person. What chance
would the resultant child have of obtaining full emotional maturity
himself in a basically unstable environment?8 7
To the same effect is the statement by Dr. Ruth W. Berenda, psycho-
analyst and former member of the Psychiatric Clinic of New York City's
Domestic Relations Court:
When a couple adopt a child, they admit openly that they cannot
have one of their own. But when they are the parents of an artificially
inseminated child they often conceal the true facts and try to present a
front of normality. The result - both a self-deception and a deception
to the world - can be harmful to their relationship.... And I am not
at all certain that inost stable men would be willing to act as donors.
88
A factual rejoinder to the claims of the AID advocates is found in a
report in the Rand (So. Africa) Daily Mail of March 15, 1957, that the
practice of AID "has been entirely suspended in New South Wales, Victoria
and Queensland, because of family breakdowns and the grave religious and
legal problems created."8 9
The most violent sociological attacks upon AID have been aimed at its
alleged degrading influence on human dignity. For example, "It is hardly in
keeping with the dignity of the human race to treat a man as if he were a
stallion at stud .... It is well arguable that, from a wider point of view,
divorce with all its evils is preferable to the saving of a few marriages by
this means." 90
A much vaunted feature of AID, as urged by its stronger advocates is
the beneficial effect derived from the scientific selection of a donor of rigidly
high moral, intellectual and physical standards. Doctor Guttmacher 91 would
test the donor by asking himself: "Is that the kind of man whom I would
like my daughter to marry?" '92 A caustic rebuke of professional donors in
general is given by Father Kelly in reply:
If I had a daughter, I would not want her to marry a man whose
sense of moral values was such that he would calmly enter a doctor's
office or laboratory and ejaculate his semen into a glass jar for a sum of
money.
93
Other attacks have centered upon the dangers to society from unsettling
public records through falsification of birth certificates94 and the dangers to
87 Bohn, Artificial Insemination: Psychologic and Psychiatric Evaluation, 34 U. DET. L. J. 397
(1957).
88 Lang, Artificial Insemination-Legitimate or Illegitimate?, McCalls, May, 1955, p. 33, p. 62,
cited in LoGatto, op. cit supra note 45.
89 Hahlo, op. cit. supra note 33.
90 Id. at 176.
91 See note 83 supra.
92 Quoted in Kelly, op. cit. supra note 5, at 144.
93 Ibid.
94 See criticism by Dr. Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury, N. Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1949,
p. 13, col. 2.
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the donor who is a father with neither the perquisites nor the responsibilities
of parenthood.9 5
IV. RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL ASPECTS
The division of opinion on the legal and sociological aspects of AI have
their reflection, if not their basis, in its religious aspect. AIH seems to attract
disapproval only from the Catholic Church and from some spokesmen of
the Church of England. 96 AID, on the other hand, has given rise to a wide
variety of divergent and contradictory views. For the sake of an orderly pre-
sentation, we will first glance at some representative Jewish statements on the
subject, then examine the Protestant attitude and finally set forth the Catholic
position.
Rabbi Benjamin Friedman, in a symposium on AI stated that:
There is no ecclesiastical synod in Judaism that has the power to
impose its authority upon all Jews. Only the belief in God's unity, as
expressed in "Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One",
has been unanimously accepted as a religious imperative. There is no
one official Rabbinical pronouncement concerning the Jewish attitude
toward artificial insemination.
97
In further support of his disavowal of an official Jewish position on the
matter, Rabbi Friedman refers to responsa (questions and answers) on the
question which were prepared and presented in 1953 by two outstanding
rabbinical scholars, Dr. Soleman B. Freehof, Rabbi of Temple Radef Shalom,
Pittsburgh, Pa., and Dr. Alexander Guttman, Professor at the Hebrew Union
College, Cincinnati, Ohio. Rabbi Friedman concludes that "The Rabbis do
not state authoritatively that the technique of artificial insemination is for-
bidden or permitted. Each Jew may accept or reject the conclusions tendered
by these rabbinical authorities." 98
However, this is not to say that rabbinical authorities are entirely silent
on the subject. Rabbi Emanuel Rackman, President of the New York Board
of Rabbis, has stated that 9 according to Jewish law, AID is not adultery and
the offspring is legitimate, whether or not the mother is married. 00 But, he
indicates that, since the donor is the natural father, and since intermarriage
between offspring of the same donor would be incest, "AID has not been
encouraged by rabbis."' 0'1 Further, he verifies that, "Jewish criminal and per-
sonal status law creates no problems with regard to the alleged adultery of
the AID mother or the legitimacy of the issue."'1 And, finally, Rabbi Rack-
man concludes:
That Jewish law is so much more liberal than Christian law is due
to the fact that the two legal systems parted ways centuries ago with
regard to their conceptions of illegitimacy. According to Judaism, the
95 See Bon;, op. cit. supra note 87; see also the excellent analysis by Rev. Anthony F. LoGatto,
Artificial Insemination 11; Ethical and Sociological Aspects, 1 CATHOLIc LAW. 267 (1955).
96 See Bezzant, Artificial Human Insemination, The Fort-Nightly, Feb., 1949, p. 78.
97 7 SYRACUSE L. REv. 96, 104 (1956).
98 Id. at 105.
99 Morality in Medico-Legal Problems: A Jewish View 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1205 (1956).
100 Citing B. A. Uziel, Mishpete Uziel, Even ha - 'Ezer, No. 19.
101 Rackman, op. cit. supra note 98, at 1209.
102 Id. at 1209.
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child of an unwed mother is not illegitimate. A child is illegitimate only
when it is conclusively established that it was born of an adulterous or
incestuous relationship, and since it is virtually impossible ever to prove
that any conception is due to adultery or incest - for the husband is
always presumed to be the father of his wife's children, even if he proves
that he was on another planet for years - illegitimacy is a status that is
more a threat than a legal reality.
103
The Protestant positions on AID can be variously stated. For example,
there is the attitude of Dr. Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury, and
official leader of the Anglican Church, who declared in 1949 that AID in-
volves criminal perjury in the universal falsification of birth records which is
attendant upon AID, endangers the moral security of the child, the family and
society, and is contrary to Christian principles. 104
A less dogmatic and quite favorable position is that of the Rev. Charles
C. Noble who explains the Protestant attitude thus in the following excerpts: 10 5
No one can or should speak for all Protestants. There are few,
if any official announcements on the subject by the major Protestant
denominations. Even if there were, their authority would be distinctly
limited. Probably, there are as many opinions on artificial insemination
among Protestant Christians as there are Protestants.
Nevertheless, a Protestant attitude can be suggested. We are open-
minded toward, concerned about, and hospitable to the constructive
possibilities which may be involved in artificial insemination.
This is a delicate field in which we must proceed with great caution
and no great body of Churchmen would wish to set their seal of
approval upon artificial insemination until a great deal more exploratory
work has been done. Nevertheless, it would seem socially frustrating
and morally reprehensible arbitrarily to block further efforts to dis-
cover the possiblities of this new hope in the lives of many childless
couples.
I hazard these generalizations because it seems obvious that the
sacredness of human life. is not violated in any way by this reverent
and careful induction of its beginning; that any couple sincerely desir-
ing and needing to utilize AI will be furthering the expansion of God's
love in a widening family circle; that frustrated men and women deeply
longing for children will be able in this way to gain a fulfillment other-
wise denied them; and that the free and responsible spirit should have
an opportunity to utilize the advancements of science for the enrich-
ment of the family of God if he so desires.
In a more cautious, and less laudatory vein, Professor Paul Ramsey of
Princeton University, although he disapproves personally of AID as an
"infraction of the pledge of ideal marriage," has written that:
AID is a far more responsible decision than ordinary adultery, and
if some people want to make it a part of their marriages, I do not
believe the law should prevent them. Laws certainly need to be devised
for the protection of AID children.10
1o3 Id. at 1210.
104 New York Times, op. cit. supra, note 94, discussed in 34 IowA L. REv. 658 (1949).
105 Artificial Insemination, The Religious Viewpoints: Protestant, 7 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 96, 101,
102, 103 (1956).
106 Freedom and Responsibility in Medical and Sex Ethics - A Protestant View, 31 N. Y. U. L.
REv. 1189, 1198 (1956).
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Finally, let us hear from Dr. Joseph Fletcher, author of the provocative
Morals and Medicine:
The claim that AID is immoral rests upon the view that marriage
is an absolute generative, as well as sexual, monopoly; and that parent-
hood is an essentially, if not solely physiological partnership. Neither
of these ideas is compatible with a morality that welcomes emancipation
from natural necessity or with the Christian ethic which raises morality
to the level of love (a personal bond) above the determinism of nature
and the rigidities of the law as distinguished from love -. 107
To round out this sampling of the Protestant attitude, mention should
be made of another pronouncement of the Archbishop of Canterbury, leader
of the Anglican Church, that AID is adulteryl10 and also of the judgment of
his specially appointed commission which in 1948 condemned AID and said
that AID without the husband's consent should be sufficient ground for
divorce. 0 9
The Catholic position admits of little or no equivocation. The Church
has been on record against AI from at least 1897, when the Sacred Con-
gregation of the Holy Office pronounced AI to be illicit.110 We are fortunate
in having a detailed analysis of the problem by the late Pope Pius XII in his
Discourse to the Fourth International Congress of Catholic Doctors, con-
ducted at Rome, September 29, 1949:-11
1. The practice of this artificial insemination, when it concerns
a human being, cannot be considered exclusively or even principally,
from the biological and medical point of view, while ignoring that of
morality and right.
2. Artificial insemination, outside marriage, is to be condemned
purely and simply as immoral. The Natural Law and the Divine Positive
Law lay down that the creation of a new life may be the fruit of
marriage only. Marriage alone safeguards the dignity of the husband
and wife (particularly of the wife, in the present case), and their
personal welfare. Of itself, it alone provides for the welfare and up-
bringing of the child. Consequently, there can be no divergence of
opinion possible among Catholics about the condemnation of artific-
ial insemination outside marriage. The child conceived in these
conditions by that very fact would be illegitimate.
3. Artificial insemination in marriage, but produced by the active
element of a third person, is equally immoral, and, as such, to be
condemned outright. The husband and wife alone have a reciprocal
right over their bodies in order to engender a new life; and this right
is exclusive, untransferrable, inalienable. This ought to be so too,
from a consideration for the child. Nature imposes on the person, who
gives life to a baby, the duty of its conservation and of its education,
by very reason of the bond established. But no bond of origin, no moral
and juridical bond of conjugal procreation, exists between the legitimate
107 Op. cit. supra note 81, at 139.
108 See LoGatto, op. cit. supra note 85, at 279.
109 Ibid.; see also Note, 8 U. FLA. L. Rav. 304 (1955).
110 See Kelly, op. cit. supra note 5, at 136.
111 As quoted by Rev. Gannon F. Ryan in 7 SYRACusE L. RaV., 99, 100, 101 (1955); see the
helpful questions and answers prepared by Father Ryan supra; also valuable are the exposition by
Kelly, op. cit. supra note 5, and the analysis by LoGatto, op. cit. supra note 95, at 279.
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husband and the child who is the fruit of the active element of a third
party - even in the case where the husband has given his consent.
4. As to the lawfulness of artificial insemination in marriage,
let it suffice for the moment that We call to your minds these prin-
ciples of the Natural Law: the mere fact that the result envisaged
is attained by these means, does not justify the use of the means itself;
nor is the desire of the husband and wife to have a child - in itself
a very legitimate desire - sufficient to prove the legitimacy of having
recourse to artificial insemination, which would fulfill this desire.
Pope Pius XII reaffirmed this position in a later address:" 2
To reduce the cohabitation of married persons and the conjugal act
to a mere organic function for the transmission of the germ of life
would be to convert the domestic hearth, sanctuary of the family, into
nothing more than a biological laboratory ... The conjugal act in its
natural structure is a personal action, a simultaneous and immediate
cooperation of the spouses which by the very nature of the participants
and the special character of the act, is the expression of that mutual
self-giving which in the words of Holy Scripture, effects the union "in
one flesh."
This is much more than the mere union of two life-germs, which
can be brought about also artificially, that is, without the natural act of
the spouses. The conjugal act, as it is planned and willed by nature,
implies a personal cooperation, the right to which the parties have
mutually conferred on each other in contracting marriage.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Here your writer will advance what he believes to be a few prudent
suggestions. Novelty or originality can hardly be claimed for them; nor
would such a characteristic add anything to their merit. Supporting reasons
will be advanced here only sketchily, if at all; otherwise there would follow a
mere repetition of the body of this paper.
1. AIR should not be regulated specifically by legislation. The social
danger is minimal and existing medical rules would seem to provide
sufficient safe-guards for the cleanliness and integrity of the procedure.
2. The performance of AID, with or without the consent of the hus-
band, should be made a criminal offense on the part of the doctor, or
other implementing intermediary, and the donor. The certain increase
in the likely occurrence of incest would be sufficient reason alone for
such a prohibition. Statutory requirements of adequate disclosure and
of official registration of the birth are not enough to prevent the secrecy
which leads to incest even if they were enforced as strictly as possible;
the impulse of privacy is too strong. In fact, even a personal criminal
penalty for the act itself may not be an adequate deterrent; however,
it is difficult to see what more could be done. If AID were made criminal
on the part of the mother and her husband, that would have a harmful
effect in inhibiting adoptions in those cases where AID might be per-
formed in violation of the law or in states not prohibiting AID.
3. AID should not be declared to be adultery. Nor should AID with-
out the husband's consent be made a ground for divorce. There is an
112 Kelly, op. cit. supra note 5, at 136-137.
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obvious difference between AID, replete though it is with its own
dangers, and the clandestine personal relationship which alone, in New
York at least, will legally sunder a marriage.
4. AID children should be declared by statute to be illegitimate,
whether the AID was with or without the consent of the husband. This
rule should have only prospective effect; the tangle which would result
from a retrospective decree of the illegitimacy of the thousands of AID
children, who are regarded as legitimate by their families and some
courts, would be insoluble. A rule of illegitimacy would seem to be
dictated by the inherently extra-marital nature of AID, and would bar
the possibility of an unwanted, or at most a tolerated, intrusion by an
AID child into the husband's inheritance pattern. In most states an
illegitimate child can inherit only from its mother and presumably an
AID illegitimate child could not inherit from the donor. If the husband
wishes to provide for the child, he can do so by will or he can adopt the
child. If an AID child were legitimate, there would seem to be no reason
why a child born of a common adulterous union would not be legitimate,
at least where the husband condoned the adultery. An extension of the
concept of legitimacy to cover an AID child would make it wholly
inexact.
5. Adoption procedures should be liberalized to permit greater secrecy
and dispatch in the adoption of AID children. Even assuming the
illegality of AID there should be a mechanism for adopting AID children
already born and those who may thereafter be born in violation of the
law or in states not prohibiting AID.
6. The falstification of birth records should be strictly prosecuted with
criminal sanctions imposed upon all parties knowingly participating in
the fraud. A proper birth record entry should be made a prerequisite for
adoption of the AID child by the husband. As a practical matter, nothing
can be done about the false entries already made, with the possible ex-
ception of a privilege to correct partially false entries without criminal
liability. But, what if the corrected entries show a present husband and
wife to be AID offspring of the same donor? Upon that note, and with
a feeling that this is where we came in your writer respectfully throws in
the towel.
